We consider a two-stage market mechanism for trading electricity including renewable generation as an alternative to the widely used multi-settlement market structure. The two-stage market structure allows for recourse decisions by the market operator, which are not possible in today's markets. We allow for different conventional generation cost curves in the forward and the real-time stages. We have considered costs of demand response programs and black outs but have ignored network structure for the sake of simplicity. Our first result is to show existence (by construction) of a sequential competitive equilibrium (SCEq) in such a two-stage market. We argue social welfare properties of such an SCEq, and then design a market mechanism that achieves social welfare maximization when the market participants are non-strategic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity markets in the US (and most of the world) are operated as multi-settlement markets. A large fraction of electricity is traded in the organized markets [9] . These are run by an independent system operator (ISO) as multiple forward markets, and a real-time or spot market. The forward markets operate at various time-scales: day-ahead, hourahead, etc. while the real-time market is opened five minutes prior. These markets are operated independently of each other, i.e., without recourse by the market operator though the decision-making of the participants is obviously coupled.
Until a few years ago, the primary uncertainty while trading in forward markets was in demand forecasts. As we approach real-time, this uncertainty reduces to 5%, or lower [7] . With the high penetration of renewables we are seeing today, there is increasing uncertainty in generation as well. For example, in California, renewables account for an estimated nearly 34% of the total retail energy sales [3] . In fact, the state has mandated 100% of power to come from renewables by 2045 [5] . In other countries, most notably Germany, it has been reported that at times 100% of power came from renewables [1] . As can be imagined, this has introduced an order of magnitude greater uncertainty in net demand (demand minus renewable generation) than the current market structures have been able to handle. There is thus a need for new stochastic electricity market designs that can handle such uncertainty.
Given that economic dispatch is a multi-stage process, it only makes sense to couple the markets across various timescales (in various forward and the real-time markets) and allow for recourse decisions. This can enable achievement of greater efficiencies through the marketplace than are The authors are with the ECE Department at the University of Southern California. Emails: {dahlin,rahul.jain}@usc.edu. This work was supported by NSF Awards ECCS-1611574 and ECCS-1810447. possible with the current multi-settlement market structure albeit with stochastic objectives of optimality. While it is an obvious point, it is worth repeating that if appropriate market architectures are not used for electricity trading, this can lead to inefficiencies and even affect reliability. The California electricity market debacle of early 2000s serves as an important lesson [2] .
In this paper, we study how multi-stage markets for electricity trading may work. We include multiple generators and load serving entities (LSEs) and consider two-stages: a stage 1 (forward stage) where only a forecast of renewable generation is available, and a stage 2 (the real-time stage), when exact realization of renewable generation is available. A dispatch decision is taken in stage 1. The economic dispatch problem is formulated as a two-stage stochastic program with recourse. The recourse decision in stage 2 is used to achieve power balance. Uncertainty in demand is ignored though it only adds to uncertainty in net demand which does not change things much. Network structure is also ignored and will be treated in future work. The generators own both dispatchable (i.e., controllable) primary and ancillary plants, while each LSE owns a nondispatchable or stochastic, renewable source, as is becoming more common [8] . In addition, it is assumed that the LSEs run a demand response (DR) program that gives each a lever to curtail demand to some extent, and at a cost, in scenarios where generation falls short of the overall demand [10] . As an emergency recourse, the LSEs may schedule rolling blackouts at high (societal) cost, which thus must be avoided to the extent possible. We regard all participants to be non-strategic and acting as pricetakers.
Our main result is the proof of existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium in this two-stage market with recourse, i.e., we show existence of first and second stage prices such that the first and second stage generation and consumption decisions achieve market clearance in stage 2, and power balance is achieved in real-time. We also establish analogues of the first and second fundamental theorems of welfare economics in the multi-stage setting. Together these theorems state that the sequential competitive equilibrium market allocation achieves market efficiency, i.e., social welfare maximization, and market efficiency can be supported by such an equilibrium. We then outline a twostage market mechanism that can be used for multi-stage economic dispatch.
Related work. The closest work to this paper is the dynamic competitive equilibrium framework in [13] and [14] which considers a much more general setting, but focuses on showing existence of such a competitive equilibrium, while we are motivated by design of a multi-stage market mechanism for economic dispatch that can be used to achieve it. Other related work is [6] , which does sequential equilibrium analysis but in the current multi-settlement market, and [12] , which examines the need for dispatching storage, again in current multi-settlement markets, concluding that storage decisions can be left to other entities and the system operator need not dispatch it without any loss in market efficiency. Neither of these papers address the issue of alternative market designs for multi-stage economic dispatch with uncertain generation and recourse action.
II. ELECTRICITY MARKET MODEL
We consider a simple setting with I generators, and J LSEs. The LSEs can be thought of as electric utilities. A third neutral entity, the independent system operator (ISO), operates the power grid and also plays the role of the social planner (SP). For simplicity we consider a single bus network.
We consider a two-stage setting, where generation is dispatched in the first stage (also called day ahead or DA) and adjusted in the second stage (real time or RT) to fulfill demand. Note, decision variables with first subscript k = 1, 2 correspond to the kth stage.
Let D j 0 denote the aggregate consumer demand, to be met with procurements by LSE j. We assume that this demand is inelastic, i.e., it does not change in response to changes in first or second stage prices.
LSE j's stochastic, renewable generation source has random integer valued generation level W j 2 [0, w j ], where w j 2 Z + . For simplicity, from this point we consider the vector of renewable generation W = (W 1 , . . . , W J ) > takes on finitely many values and has associated probability mass function denoted p = (p 0 , . . . , p w ). This probability distribution is assumed to be common knowledge amongst all participants in the market. Renewable generation incurs zero marginal cost.
Each LSE may purchase energy in both the DA and RT markets, at prices P 1 and P 2 (w) (given W = w), respectively, where P 2 : R J + ! R. In our finite scenario setting, P 2 can be considered as the vector P 2 := (P 2 (0), . . . , P 2 (w)) > . Denote the amounts purchased by the LSE in the first and second stages as y L 1,j and y L 2,j (w), respectively. Additionally, we assume that consumers participate in demand response programs, wherein they are compensated for curtailing their consumption in response to LSE requests or other signals. Specifically, given that y L 1,j has been scheduled at the close of the first stage market, and W = w, LSE j may request that consumers reduce their aggregate energy demand by amount x L 2,j (w), at the overall cost of c dr,j (x L 2,j (w)). Having scheduled consumption y L 1,j in the first stage, we allow that the LSE may effectively schedule a shortfall in energy provided to its consumers, by procuring a combined quantity of energy and demand reduction in the RT market less than residual demand D y L 1,j . Such an action incurs blackout cost c bo (z L 2,j (w)), where
We assume that each LSE j is price taking, i.e., its consumption decisions y L 1,j and y L 2,j (w) do not affect the prices in either stage. Therefore, given P 1 and P 2 (w), renewable generation vector W = w, as well as consumption decisions y L 1,j and y L 2,j (w), and demand response and blackout decisions x L 2,j (w) and z L 2,j (w), the utility enjoyed by LSE j's customers is
Each LSE seeks to maximize the expectation of (2) with its first and second stage decisions. Given y L 1,j , generation vector W = w, and second stage price schedule P 2 , the LSE's second stage optimization problem is
Note that (4) is an inequality in order to avoid infeasibility scenarios in which D j w j < 0, i.e., renewable generation exceeds residual demand D j y L 1,j . Let ⇡ L 2,j (y L 1,j ; w, P 2 ) denote the maximum utility achievable in (LSE2 j ), given LSE j's first stage decision, and the renewable generation realization and prices. Then, LSE j's first stage optimization problem, given prices P 1 and P 2 , is to maximize its summed first stage utility, P 1 y L 1,j , and expected maximum second stage utility with respect to the uncertainty in renewable generation
We consider two different sources of power generation for each generator. The first is a primary dispatchable nonrenewable power station owned by the generator i, which can be scheduled to produce amount y G 1,i 2 R + at cost c 1,i (y G 1,i ). We assume that this generator is inflexible, so that once scheduled, its generation level must remain fixed.
Secondly, generator i has access to a secondary or ancillary dispatchable source, such as a gas turbine. Specifically, having scheduled primary generation amount y G 1,i , and then observed W = w, the generator may choose to produce secondary energy amount y G 2,i (w) 2 R + at cost c 2,i (y G 2,i (w)). It is assumed that ancillary energy produced in excess of consumer demand can be disposed of at zero cost, or sold in a separate spot market which we do not consider here.
The generator is compensated for first stage generation y G 1,i at price P 1 . Given W = w, the generator is compensated for second stage generation y G 2,i (w) at price P 2 (w). We assume that each generator i is price taking. So, given prices P 1 and P 2 , and W = w, as well as dispatch decisions y G 1,i and y G 2,i (w), generator i's profit is
Given P 2 and renewable generation level w, generator i maximizes its second stage profit:
Let ⇡ G 2,i (w, P 2 ) denote the generator i's maximum achievable second stage profit, given W = w and P 2 . Then, in the first stage the generator i solves the following problem:
Though it appears in the objective of (GEN1 i ),
] is only an additive constant when optimizing over y G 1,i , reflecting the fact that the generator's supply decisions in the two markets can be made independently. We separate the two generator optimization problems to emphasize that the generator observes W = w before selecting y G 2,i (w). Finally, the ISO is responsible for enforcing the balance of energy supplied and consumed in each stage:
In order to study the welfare properties of the allocations included in the sequential competitive equilibrium definition in Section III-B, we now introduce a two-stage social planner's problem (SPP) corresponding to our two settlement market model. As in the static case, the SPP is concerned with the combined welfare of all market participants. Given renewable generation vector W = w, the aggregate welfare in our setting is given by the sum of LSE utilities and generator profits specified in (2) and (9),
) for all i, j, and w are the SP's first and second stage decisions, the second stage decisions made with the knowledge that W = w. Note that the aggregate welfare does not depend upon market prices.
Letŷ G 1 = (ŷ G 1,1 , . . . ,ŷ G 1,I ) > . Definingŷ L 1 similarly, given y 1 := (ŷ G 1 ,ŷ L 1 ) and W = w, the social planner's second stage optimization problem is
as the maximum aggregate welfare achievable in the second stage, taking first stage decisions as given, and W = w. Then, the SP's first stage problem is:
Letŷ 2 (w) := (ŷ G 2 (w),ŷ L 2 (w)) for all w, and similarly for x 2 (w). The optimal solutionsŷ ⇤ 1 and (ŷ ⇤ 2 (·),x ⇤ 2 (·)) to (SPP1) and (SPP2) are called efficient sequential allocations.
The following assumptions are made throughout the paper. Assumption 1: c 1,i , c 2,i , c dr,j and c bo,j are strictly convex, increasing, differentiable, and nonnegative over R + , for all i and j.
We first argue that problems (SPP1) and (SPP2) can be combined into a single-stage optimization problem.
Lemma 1: The two-stage problem (SPP1)-(SPP2) is equivalent to the following primal single-stage problem:
x L 2,j (w) 0,ẑ L 2,j (w) 0 8 w, j.
(27) Proof: See the Appendix of [4] . In particular, "equivalent" in Lemma 1 means that (SPP-P) and (SPP1) have the same optimal objective value. Further, if (ŷ G⇤ 1 ,ŷ L⇤ 1 ,ŷ G⇤ 2 (·),ŷ L⇤ 2 (·),x L⇤ 2 (·),ẑ L⇤ 2 (·)) is optimal for (SPP-P), then (ŷ G⇤ 1 ,ŷ L⇤ 1 ) is optimal for (SPP1) and (ŷ G⇤
is optimal for (SPP-P). Similar arguments to the one in the proof of Lemma 1 can be made for the generator and LSE problems, giving
and (LSE-P j ) max
III. SEQUENTIAL COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
In a single-stage market for a single good, a competitive equilibrium is specified by a price P and quantity x such that, given P , producers find it optimal to produce, and consumers find it optimal to purchase, quantity x of the good. Thus, the market clears, i.e., demand equals supply.
To understand the outcome of the two-stage market, we consider a sequential version of competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1: A sequential competitive equilibrium (SCEq) is a tuple (y G⇤ 1 , y L⇤ 1 , y G⇤ 2 (·), y L⇤ 2 (·), x L⇤ 2 (·), P ⇤ 1 , P ⇤ 2 (·)) such that, for all i and j, given P ⇤ 1 and P ⇤ 2 (·), y G⇤ 1,i is optimal for (GEN1 i ), y L⇤ 1,j is optimal for (LSE1 j ), and, given w and P 2 (w), y G⇤ 2,i (w) is optimal for (GEN2 i ) and
(y ⇤ 2,j (w), x ⇤ 2,j (w)) is optimal for (LSE2 j ), and the markets clear in both stages in all scenarios:
(34) Note that in the SCEq definition, P ⇤ 2 (·) and y G⇤ 2,i (·), y L⇤ 2,j (·), and x L⇤ 2,j (·), for each i and j, are functions. We say that for problems involving shortfall decisions, that the ancillary generation and DR decisions form a solution, since they are enough to uniquely determine the shortfall decisions. For example, (ŷ G⇤ 2 (·),ŷ L⇤ 2 (·),x L⇤ 2 (·)) solves (SPP2). We first investigate the existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium in the two-stage market. Letˆ ⇤ 1 and ⇤ 2 = (ˆ ⇤ 2 (0), . . . ,ˆ ⇤ 2 (w)) > denote optimal dual selections associated with constraints (23) and (24) in (SPP-P).
Theorem 1: Under Assumption 1, a sequential competitive equilibrium exists, and is given by
is the primal solution to (SPP-P), and (ˆ ⇤ 1 ,ˆ ⇤ 2 (·)) is an optimal dual solution to (SPP-P).
Proof: In addition to feasibility constraints (22)-(27), the optimal solution to (SPP-P), denoted as
, satisfies the following KKT conditions:
Due to Assumption 1, the optimal solution to (SPP-P) is unique when it exists. We now show that this solution also gives optimal solutions to (GEN-P i ) and (LSE-P j ) for each i and j.
In addition to the nonnegativity constraints listed in (29), the optimal solution for (GEN-P i ) satisfies
In addition to the feasibility constraints (31)-(33), the optimal solution for (LSE-P j ) satisfies
where µ L⇤ j is the optimal dual vector corresponding to constraint (31) in (LSE-P j ). Next, we define candidate prices
and make the following claim. Claim 1: (ŷ G⇤ 1 ,ŷ L⇤ 1 ,ŷ G⇤ 2 (·),ŷ L⇤ 2 (·),x L⇤ 2 (·), P 1 , P 2 (w)) is a SCEq, where P 1 and P 2 (·) are defined in (63), and (ŷ G⇤ 1 ,ŷ L⇤ 1 ,ŷ G⇤ 2 (·),ŷ L⇤ 2 (·),x L⇤ 2 (·)) is the unique solution to (SPP-P).
Proof: Starting with (GEN-P i ), substituting for P 1 and P 2 (w) in (49)-(52), and selecting y G 1,i =ŷ G⇤ 1,i and y G 2,i (w) = y G⇤ 2,i (w) gives
which are identical to (35)-(38). Thus, given P 1 and P 2 (·), (ŷ G⇤ 1,i ,ŷ G⇤ 2,i (·)) is optimal for (GEN-P i ). Therefore,ŷ G⇤ 1,i is optimal for (GEN1 i ) andŷ G⇤ 2,i (w) is optimal for (GEN2 i ) for all w, given P 2 (w).
Turning to the LSE's problem, substituting for P 1 and P 2 (w) in (53)-(62) and selecting y L⇤
Further selecting µ L⇤ j (w) =μ ⇤ j (w) for all w makes (68)-(77) identical to (39)-(48). Thus, given prices (63), there exists a Lagrange vector µ L⇤ j (·) such that together (ŷ L⇤ 1,j ,ŷ L⇤ 2,j (·),x L⇤ 2,j (·),ẑ L⇤ 2,j (·), µ L⇤ j (·)) satisfy the KKT conditions for (LSE j ). Therefore,ŷ L⇤ 1,j is optimal for (LSE1 j ) and (ŷ L⇤ 2,j (w),x L⇤ 2,j (w),ẑ L⇤ 2,j (w)) is optimal for (LSE2 j ) for all w, givenŷ L⇤ 1,j . Finally, due to constraints (23) and (24), the market clears at each stage. Therefore, we have shown that the tuple given in the claim is a sequential competitive equilibrium. Thus, we have proven both the claim and Theorem 1.
Social Welfare Theorems: There is an important connection between equilibrium and efficient allocations, described by the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. We can now state the first and second theorems of welfare economics for the two-stage setting. We say that a sequential equilibrium supports an allocation if the allocation is included in the equilibrium.
Theorem 2: (i) Every sequential competitive equilibrium supports an efficient sequential allocation. (ii) Conversely, an efficient sequential allocation can be supported by a sequential competitive equilibrium.
Proof: To prove the first statement, note that by definition, under a sequential competitive equilibrium, markets clear in both stages. This condition may be seen as equivalent to posing the following ISO problem [13] :
s.t.
and then requiring that (y G⇤ 1 , y L⇤ 1 , y G⇤ 2 (·), y L⇤ 2 (·)) as given in the SCEq definition in Section II solves (ISO).
Summing the objectives of all agents, i.e., (GEN-P i ), (LSE-P j ) over all i and j, along with the objective of (ISO) recovers the objective of (SPP-P). Similarly, collecting the constraints from all of the individual (GEN-P i ) and (LSE-P j ) problems, along with (80) recovers the full set of constraints found in (SPP-P). Together, therefore, (ISO), along with each (GEN-P i ) and (LSE-P j ) represent a decomposition (SPP-P).
Selecting the sequential equilibrium solution for (SPP-P), as well asˆ ⇤ 1 = P ⇤ 1 andˆ ⇤ 2 (w) = P ⇤ 2 (w) for all w makes (35)-(38) identical to the (GEN-P i ) KKT conditions (49)-(52), and (39)-(48) identical to (LSE-P j ) KKT conditions (53)-(62). See [4] for further details. Since (y G⇤ 1,i , y G⇤ 2,i (·)) for each i and (y L⇤ 1,j , y L⇤ 2,j (·)) for each j form an optimal solution for (ISO), constraints (23) and (24) in (SPP-P) are satisfied as well, so that overall the sequential equilibrium is feasible for (SPP-P), and thus supports an efficient allocation.
The proof of the second statement follows directly from the construction in the proof of Theorem 1.
IV. TWO-STAGE MECHANISM FOR ELECTRICITY MARKET WITH RENEWABLE GENERATION
The proof of Theorem 1 showed that SCEq prices arise from the dual solution to (SPP-P). Assume that each cost function in the objective of (SPP-P) can be finitely parametrized (e.g. by ✓ 1,i in the case of c 1,i ). For example, each cost function might take the form c(x) = ax 2 + bx for some ✓ = (a, b) 2 R 2 + . Assuming that the generators and LSEs are not strategic, and that the distribution of W is known to all players, the following mechanism implements the SCEq, clearing the market at the end of stage 2: (1) Each generator i submits (✓ 1,i , ✓ 2,i ) and LSE j submits (✓ dr,j , ✓ bo,j ). (2) The ISO solves (SPP-P), and announces stage 1 price P ⇤ 1 =ˆ ⇤ 1 and stage 2 price schedule P ⇤ 2 (·) =ˆ ⇤ 2 (·). (3) Generator i solves (GEN1 i ) and LSE j solves (LSE1 j ).
LSE j pays P ⇤ 1 y L⇤ 1,j , and generator i receives P ⇤ 1 y G⇤ 1,i . (4) At the start of stage 2, the renewable generation output W = w is observed by both the generators and LSEs. Generator i solves (GEN2 i ) and LSE j solves (LSE2 j ). LSE j pays P ⇤ 2 (w)y L⇤ 2,j (w), and generator i receives P ⇤ 2 (w)y G⇤ 2,i (w). (5) Generator i produces y G⇤ 1,i + y G⇤ 2,i (w), and the LSE receives y L⇤ 1,j + y L⇤ 2,j (w). We stress that the equilibrium quantities appearing in the mechanism steps above arise as solutions to the individual entities' problems, given the equilibrium prices announced in step 2. For example in step 3 y G⇤ 1,i = y G⇤ 1,i , given P ⇤ 1 =ˆ ⇤ 1 . In step 2 of the mechanism above, the ISO must announce prices to the generators and the LSEs. We note here that, due to (SPP-P) KKT conditions (35)-(38) and Assumption 1, ifŷ G⇤ 1,i > 0 for some i, thatˆ ⇤ 1 is uniquely defined as c 0 1,i (ŷ G⇤ 1,i ). Ifŷ G⇤ 1,i = 0 for all i, thenˆ ⇤ 1 may not be unique, butˆ ⇤ 1 = min i c 0 1,i (0) selects the highest lower bound available, so that (39) is still satisfied. Similarly if, for a given w,ŷ G⇤ 2,i (w) > 0 for some i, thenˆ ⇤ 2 (w) is uniquely defined as c 0 2,i (ŷ G⇤ 2,i (w)). Ifŷ G⇤ 2,i (w) = 0 for all i, thenˆ ⇤ 2 (w) = min i c 0 2,i (0) again selects the highest lower bound available, so that (41) is satisfied.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a two-stage market mechanism wherein the economic dispatch problem is formulated as a two-stage stochastic program with recourse. The design of this mechanism follows from the proof of our main result, the existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium in this two-stage setting. We also establish that every competitive equilibrium supports an efficient allocation, and conversely every efficient allocation can be supported by a sequential competitive equilibrium. We have ignored network topology for the sake of simplicity though that could be incorporated as well, and will be completed in future work. Market participants are regarded as nonstrategic. In the future, we will consider strategic generators and LSEs, and investigate incentive compatible properties of the market mechanism designed in Section IV, as well as design one if it is found to be deficient.
